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Hanley: Changing DoD’s Analysis Paradigm

CHANGING DOD’S ANALYSIS PAR ADIGM
The Science of War Gaming and Combat/Campaign Simulation
John T. Hanley Jr.

W

ar gaming and military modeling have a well-documented history covering over two centuries, a period that coincides with the inception and
evolution of formal professional development for military officers.1 The term war
game used here refers to “a warfare model or simulation that does not involve the
operations of actual forces, in which the flow of events affects and is affected by
decisions made during the course of those events by players representing opposing sides.”2
Beginning with the early-nineteenth-century Prussian creation of war colleges
to augment operational experience, professional
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believed that war gaming contributed notably to the Prussians’ success in 1866
and 1870. However, as the popularity of war gaming spread following the Prussian victories, semirigid and free-form adjudication based on the game director’s
judgment became more popular.3
War colleges used war gaming as a basis for both practical exercises and
theoretical analyses. Both war colleges and military staffs used war gaming to
develop strategy. In addition, in the early twentieth century, quantitative military modeling outside of war gaming was adopted more widely. New techniques
were formulated, such as Lanchester equations, which Frederick W. Lanchester
published in 1916.4
During World War II, the United States and the United Kingdom instituted
operations evaluation groups, consisting of scientists, to quantify the outcomes
of military practices and seek improvements. These groups observed operations,
collected data, and created models of military operations analogous to the models
they used in scientific endeavors. Following World War II, the U.S. government
established federal contract research centers to continue this practice in peacetime.5 The Navy transformed its Operations Research Group into an Operations
Evaluation Group that became the Center for Naval Analyses. The Air Force established RAND. The Army established its Operations Research Office at Johns
Hopkins University, which became the Research Analysis Corporation. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) founded a Weapons Systems Evaluation Group that
became the Institute for Defense Analyses.6 Initially these organizations provided
mechanisms for contracting university professors; eventually, they developed
permanent staffs.
In the long-term competition with the Soviets, the emphasis shifted from
operations research to systems analysis: operations research focuses on analyzing operations to support commanders; systems analysis focuses on supporting
the Pentagon’s policy and procurement bureaucracies by attempting to quantify
the effects of proposed platforms and weapons systems employing advancing
technology. An expansion of the practice of quantification to optimize operations spread from the military to industry, leading to the creation of operations
research as a discipline.
In 1961, coming from Ford Motor Company, Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara established the Pentagon’s Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System and a Systems Analysis Office to oversee the selection of military systems
and force allocation and determine how much was enough to invest in defense.7
Alain C. Enthoven founded the Systems Analysis Office on well-intentioned tenets.8 However, competing interests and divisions in staff responsibilities within
and among the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, and the
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services and the need to align analytical processes with Pentagon staff procedures
and budget cycles resulted in these tenets never being followed fully.
Computers rapidly expanded the scale of problems addressed in the 1960s and
’70s. Computer-based campaign simulations that strung together and iterated
sets of equations modeling combat became the primary method the Pentagon
procurement bureaucracy used to undergird arguments for selecting one military
platform or technology over another. As the Department of Defense (DoD) expanded its use of contractors to conduct analyses in the 1970s, a sizable industry
emerged to support and embed Pentagon analytical practices. “Unfortunately, the
trend over the last decades has been for DoD studies to become more focused
on standard scenarios and big [computer] models.”9 On 8 May 2015, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work and Vice Chief of the JCS Admiral James A.
Winnefeld Jr. called for initiatives to renew war gaming within DoD.10
Scientific methods form the foundation for operations research. A frequent
criticism of war gaming is that it is less scientific, and thus less useful for prediction, than computer-based combat/campaign simulation. This article examines
war gaming and combat/campaign simulations against scientific standards to
explore their usefulness and limitations and how they complement each other.
Computer-based campaign simulation involves much larger uncertainties and
indeterminacy than generally realized. Both campaign simulation and war gaming require the use of additional analytical techniques to validate and extend their
findings.
Operations research is rooted in an interactive cycle of observing fleet/field
operations, collecting data, modeling, collecting more data, proposing changes,
then cycling through those results again. The original operations research groups
involved interdisciplinary teams of scientists employing models and paradigms
from their respective disciplines to understand military operations well enough
to predict effects. DoD needs to overhaul its current analysis paradigm and its
focus on individual major defense acquisition programs, weaning itself off large,
computer-based campaign models. It should adopt analysis campaigns and cycles
of research to meet growing security challenges within limited budgets.11
SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY
The System and Its States
Bernard O. Koopman begins his study of the logical basis of combat simulation
with the following:
Basic to any scientific examination of nature is the concept of the system: the set
of interacting things considered. In a military action, the system is the totality of
men[/women] and weapons involved, together with their environment: the medium
in which the action occurs and which affects its course. And equally fundamental is
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the concept of the set of states that the system can be in, just one at any given time. . . .
In each case, the state of the system includes its physical state: positions and velocities
of the units, condition of armaments, data-gathering status, and all the meteorological specifications. But how far into the mental state of the commanders must one
go in defining the “state” of the system? This can only be settled by asking a second
question, that of the evolution of the state of the system with the passage of time.
Classical physics has traditionally considered that the state of a system is only adequately described if, once the state is given, all later states are determined: Given any
two similar systems in the same initial states, all their later states will be the same—
provided that their environmental influences (external forces) continue the same.
Thus, in Newtonian mechanics, the full and exact knowledge of the positions and
velocities of the parts of a material system determine its whole future motion. But it is
only in the simplest military operations that such an order of determinateness exists.
In far more cases, it is not feasible to specify the state of a system so that its subsequent evolution is determined. What is far more common is to have only statistical
determinateness: in a large number of similar systems starting in the same state, the
12
same proportion will go into any given later state.

The premise of combat/campaign simulation is that the evolution of the states
in some future combat can be determined adequately statistically. In war gaming, the state of the system evolves move to move through adjudication of player
decisions. Keeping in mind the concept of states helps us consider the scope and
limits of computer-based combat/campaign simulation and war gaming.
Scientific Standards
“Standards of scientific excellence, though they may occasionally be selfdefeating, on the whole and in the long run make for success.”13 However, one
must stipulate carefully what one intends when posing scientific standards, lest
they become straitjackets. “The emphasis by historians and philosophers of science is that there is no such thing as the scientific method. The more realistic
danger is that some preferred set of techniques will become identified with scientific method as such.”14
As systems analysis took hold in DoD, those seeking to determine “how much
is enough” sought to create models using equations that allowed quantitative
comparisons to predict the costs and benefits of alternative systems. As computers became more powerful, DoD turned to quantitative combat/campaign
simulations as a basis for major decisions, regarding them as more objective,
rigorous, and useful than less-formal analytical techniques, such as war gaming.
Such simulations were considered to be
• more objective, in the sense that computer models would support major
decisions based on explicit criteria of national interest, not on compromises
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/5
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among institutional forces, and provide open and explicit analysis (including
transparent data and assumptions) available to all parties
• more rigorous, in the sense that computers would provide quantitative answers to support choices among explicit, balanced, feasible alternatives and
allow reproducible runs for comparing alternatives
• more useful, in the sense that computers would allow more systematic analysis to predict the effects of decisions15
Therefore, objectivity, rigor, and usefulness provide the set of scientific standards used in this examination of combat/campaign simulation and war gaming.
Objectivity. “That is objective which insists on its own rights regardless of our
wishes, and only experience can transmit its claims to us. Experience is ultimate
because it confronts us with a continuous ultimatum. For a man to by-pass experience in the pursuit of truth is to make himself God. . . . The subjectivist lives in
a fool’s paradise.”16
Objectivity equates to “the intersubjectivity of findings independent of any
one person’s intuitive judgment.”17 Demanding intersubjectivity requires that
“a scientific observation could have been made by any observer” and “testifies
that the observation is uncontaminated by any factors save those common to all
observers.”18 “For an enterprise to be characterized as scientific it must have as its
purpose the explanation and prediction of phenomena within its subject-matter
domain and it must provide such explanation and prediction in a reasoned, and
therefore intersubjective, fashion. . . . While precise predictions are . . . preferred
to vague ones, a discipline which provides predictions of a less precise character,
but makes them correctly and in a systematic and reasoned way, must be classified as a science.”19
Concepts lead to observations, which then lead to theories and laws. Laws
have counterfactual force, carry explanatory force, and support prediction. They
serve as standpoints from which we can survey for exceptions. They provide the
basis for broader theories that advance the understanding of complicated and
complex phenomena. A definition of an expert is one who knows what context
must hold for a law to apply.20
Basic Newtonian physics involves laws strictly determining the relationships
between actions and their effects. But even physics requires statistical laws to
explain quantum phenomena, thermodynamics, etc., and cannot predict the
behavior of many multibody problems and other chaotic systems. Statistical
laws permit probabilistic explanations for phenomena involving statistical indeterminacy.21 Similarly, systems involving human behavior admit quasi laws or
tendency laws.22 “In order for the [quasi] law to be valid, it is not necessary that
no apparent exceptions occur, it is only necessary that, if an apparent exception
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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should occur, an adequate explanation should be forthcoming.”23 Statements
such as “fear, honor, and self-interest are the fundamental causes of war” qualify
as quasi laws.
Both war gaming and combat/campaign simulations are pseudoexperiments:
experiments carried out on a model instead of in reality.24 The person or team
designing the experiment reduces a substantive problem to a conceptual model
on the basis of the perception of what is relevant to the problem. This conceptual
model is a world, defined as the object or system about which a person is concerned. A state of the world is a description leaving no relevant aspect undefined.
A true state of the world is a state that does in fact obtain, i.e., the true description
of the world.25 The conceptual model is reduced further to physical and semantic
(quantitative and relational) models, each equating to a theory of behavior of
the subject matter, employed in the analysis to determine the true state.26 If the
experiment serves its purpose, this system of models produces an outcome that
can be generalized by induction to advance a substantive conclusion.27
The character of military (and civil) operations involves both “an evolving physical system, and . . . an unfolding set of plans, intentions, reasoning and counterreasoning of the men [and women] engaged in the action, the commanders.”28
War gaming addresses the plans, intentions, reasoning, and counterreasoning of the roles represented in the game. It highlights “predictions regarding the
behavior of human organizations inasmuch as the latter can be simulated most
effectively by having experts play the roles of certain members of such organizations and act out what in their judgment would be the actions, in the situation
simulated, of their real-life counterparts.”29 Outcomes result from the interacting
decisions and actions of the role players, as adjudicated by game umpires and
game-control oversight.
Epistemologically speaking, the use of an expert as an objective indicator . . . amounts
to considering the expert’s predictive pronouncement as an integral, intrinsic part
of the subject matter, and treating his[/her] reliability as part of the theory about the
subject matter.30 Our information about the expert is conjoined to our other knowledge about the field, and we proceed with the application of precisely the same inductive methods which we would apply in cases where no use of expertise is made. Our
“data” are supplemented by the expert’s . . . valuations and by his[/her] judgments of
relevance . . . , and our “theory” is supplemented by the performance of experts.
In this manner the incorporation of expert judgment into the structure of our investigation is made subject to the same safeguards which are used to assure objectivity
in other scientific investigations. The use of expertise is therefore no retreat from
objectivity or reversion to a reliance on subjective taste.31

Computer-based combat/campaign simulations focus on physical aspects
of combat. Human decisions are present and have a substantial impact on the
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/5
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output, but are embedded in the simulation construction and the choice of inputs
(data and models) rather than the decisions of combatants. To encompass human
decision in statistical determinateness, one might turn to doctrine or, absent clear
doctrine or future systems, query commanders for their expert opinions regarding decisions they would make given each possible state of the system. To be
practical, this approach requires a world with few states. One also might assume
that each commander is attempting to do maximum harm and seeks a course of
action to minimize the harm to his/her forces, using the minimax convention
of game theory.32 “A more general method of this sort is for each commander to
maximize his[/her] own value function—not necessarily the negative of his[/her]
opponent’s.”33 This approach to combat/campaign simulation assumes that once
the statistics of human decision are incorporated into the model, what remains
is the statistically determinate evolution of the military system. But separating
the human from the physical model often leads to erroneous conclusions. Barry
Watts’s research indicates that, rather than having been let down by their radars
and missiles, 80–90 percent of the pilots shot down in Vietnam and Korea never
saw their attackers until it was too late to react.34
By virtue of the statistical determinateness, the basic process is stochastic.
That is, there is a definite probability—the transition probability—that if the
system is in state x at time t it will be in state xʹ at time tʹ. “Evidently, if the values
of the transition probabilities a(x, t; xʹ, tʹ) were all known, the probabilities of every
outcome of the battle would be known—and this for every assumed starting state”
(italics in original). Thus, the whole problem of the quantitative study of military
operations is that of finding the transition probabilities from knowledge that
can reasonably be obtained. “[A]ll the standard analytical models, Monte Carlo
simulations, etc., fit into this scheme.”35 Clearly, one also must have knowledge of
the transition rates to specify at which time tʹ the new state xʹ obtains.36
In practice, analyzing stochastic processes also employs the Markovian assumption, which holds that, faced with the same state, the transition probabilities
for the system remain constant throughout the process. In the context of human
decision, this means that no learning from previous states, no history, affects the
process.
Of course, when methods of computer simulation are made in the usual way they
depend for their validity on the Markov property, but when this does not apply . . .
the numerical results, however realistic they may appear, are without logical basis—at
least until they are proved to give an acceptable degree of approximation. The act
of simplifying and still retaining the Markovian character—as well as operational
realism—is an art as well as a science. Success is more apt to be achieved by limiting
the objective of the study to the answer of a precise question rather than a diffuse
37
multitude.
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In summary: to assume that such a use of machines gives even approximately
valid information about the military operation is to assume the following:
• The human uncertainties have been removed.
• The combat situation involves a system that is, at any time, in an objectively
describable state (presumes transition probabilities and rates are known).
• The situation’s state transitions are Markovian.
• Its stochastic equations can be satisfactorily approximated by difference
equations without losing their Markovian character.
• The repetition of runs gives, by the law of large numbers, satisfactorily accurate and reliable values of the desired probabilities.38
At this point, the number of states involved in a combat simulation is worth
considering.39 Consider an engagement involving m units on the Blue side and n
units on the Red side.40 Indicate that a Blue unit has engaged a Red unit by drawing a blue line between the two units. Similarly, use a red line for a Red unit engaging a Blue unit. “The resulting colored graph indicates the state of our system.
How many different graphs are possible? Of the mn possible ways of drawing the
blue lines, any one can actually be drawn or not. Hence, there are 2mn possibilities
for the blue lines; and similarly for the red. Consequently, there are 22mn possible
colored graphs.”41 See the accompanying figure for a depiction of the case for a
combined-arms rock-paper-scissors contest in which all “units” could engage
simultaneously or in any order. The number of states of this world for a single
battle is 218. If we consider whether each engagement is successful, we double the
number of states to 236. Each additional consideration enlarges the exponent for
computing the state space.
We can perform a mind experiment to estimate how large the state space
would be for a battle that a “perfect” parallel computer the size of the universe,
given the time of the universe, might compute. In this parallel computer, the
processors are as small as protons, they operate at the speed of light, and they
are packed densely into the volume of our universe. Each processor is assigned a
distinct engagement to calculate, can compute the outcome instantaneously, and
can fetch a new engagement in 10–23 seconds, an approximation of the time it
takes light to go the diameter of a proton. Given 1045 processors per cubic meter,
1081 cubic meters in the universe, 1023 calculations per second, and 10 seconds as
an epoch a bit longer than the age of the universe, this computer could perform
10168 calculations, or about 2558.42 If 4mn = 558 and we examine the same number
of force elements on both sides, this “perfect” computer could calculate the states
for an engagement with just less than twelve force units per side. Note that this
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COMBINED-ARMS ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS

m Blue-force elements

R

R

P

P

S

S

n Red-force elements

# of states considering successful and
unsuccessful engagements = 24mn = 236
Source: Koopman, ”A Study of the Logical Basis of Combat Simulation,” pp. 871–72.

formulation of the engagement does not consider the timing of engagements,
which would vastly increase the possible states of the “world.”
Although simulations such as those of one-on-one air or naval combat might
be reduced to a computable number of states, force-on-force combat and campaign simulations quickly exceed the number of states that admit of brute-force
computation. So, how are these simulations implemented? By using a combination of shortcuts (heuristics) and clever analysis. These heuristics are essentially
quasi laws whose application requires the contribution of experts who understand well the scope of those laws’ applicability. Combat/campaign simulations
often use expected-value models to determine what would happen “on average,”
rather than Monte Carlo simulations. Increasing the number of runs does not
increase statistical prediction by the law of large numbers in these simulations,
as the expected value provides a determined outcome for each run. Lanchester
equations—developed to help predict the outcome of naval and land battles—
most often use expected values, but can employ Monte Carlo techniques.43 Varying the exponent used in Lanchester equations between square and linear laws essentially reflects the command and control and operational concept employed in
the engagement. The complexity of ground models results in heuristic techniques
such as weighted effectiveness indices / weighted unit values or qualitative judgment models to calculate engagement outcomes. All these approaches involve
subjective judgments and the insights of the analyst/team developing and using
the model. In a combat/campaign simulation, the analyst/team must use subjective judgments to anticipate every interaction represented in the simulation,
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supplement missing data, and create models that have not been validated in
actual operations or exercises.
The works of Wayne P. Hughes, Glenn A. Kent, Bernard O. Koopman, and
Paul K. Davis, among others, suggest clever approaches to overcoming computational limitations of brute-force calculations and appropriate forms of analysis.44
With the development of complexity sciences, computers came to be used to
simulate cognitive and other processes, rather than to solve equations. As Deep
Blue and AlphaGo have demonstrated, in games of finite size with well-specified
rules, computers can use artificial intelligence (AI) techniques to top human
performance.45 However, current DoD computer-based campaign simulations
use brute-force calculations. They have yet to incorporate agent-based models,
automatons, fitness landscapes, genetic algorithms, or other techniques from
complexity science. RAND incorporated some AI techniques into campaign
simulations in the 1980s, but DoD chose not to employ those features in the
simulations it adopted, instead staying with the types of deterministic and stochastic models Koopman addressed.46
So, how do we assess objectivity, given the logics of combat/computer simulation and war gaming?
Guidelines for the practice of operations research, although written with military modeling in mind, apply equally to war gaming and to combat/campaign
simulation.47 Significant distinctions between good operations research practice
and other scientific inquiry include a presumption of the existence of a client
(sponsor) and the complications presented by security classification and proprietary work. Close cooperation with the client in framing the analysis is good
practice common to any technique of analysis.
In war gaming, a design and development team develops the scenario and
reference materials (e.g., commander’s intent, task organization, subordinates’
missions, orders of battle, unit locations, weather) to establish the world and its
initial state and develop prebriefings to immerse players into the game. The team
identifies the number of competing sides, the scope of disciplines required, the
command echelons represented, the bureaucratic verisimilitude desired, and the
number and expertise of role players needed to accomplish the game objectives.
Team members also design the information conditions: the information available
to each side and its flow, the communications techniques and their verisimilitude
to accustomed formats, the physical arrangements, the move structure, and the
game rate to arrive at a desired culmination point.48 To facilitate decision making,
they construct move forms and provide for feedback among the participants. For
adjudication, they select methods and models (quantitative and qualitative) used
to change the world state resulting from each game move, and the qualifications
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and organization of game controllers and umpires. They also anticipate control
inputs of plausible events (usually wild cards, such as rogue actions or accidents
to initiate conflict) to shape player decisions to achieve game objectives.49
Combat/campaign simulations similarly frame the world for the purpose of
the pseudoexperiment and provide input data to establish its initial state. Whereas war-game design involves detailed considerations of context for role-player
decisions—with particular attention to information conditions (who knows what
and acts when), as discussed above—combat/campaign simulations remove human decision. Information conditions are embedded in the combat models. The
models selected incorporate a theory of command and control and the concept
of operations in their code—consciously or not. The analysts / team members
develop or choose models and techniques they judge appropriate to the study,
on the basis of their expertise. “A fundamental truth in analysis is that scenarios
drive the answers. Thus, much effort should go into conceiving and tuning the
scenarios used and specifying uncertainty ranges. This should be a deeply analytic affair rather than the result merely of creative people spinning stories that
raise interesting issues.”50 Whereas game scenarios are necessarily rich, to provide
the context essential for expert role playing, the world of the combat/campaign
simulation employs sparse scenarios, with only the data needed to perform the
calculations.
In war gaming, a control team and umpires run the simulation. They execute
the game design, adjudicating changes in the “true” state of the world using the
decisions of the role players, their quantitative models, and their judgments,
taking into account the game’s objectives. In computer-based combat/campaign
simulations, the computer computes the state transitions and the analyst decides
what constitutes a stopping point or state for ending the computer run. Both war
gaming and combat/campaign simulation also involve analysts who observe, record, analyze, and report on the pseudoexperiments. Costs and time available to
design, develop, and run the simulation and subsequent analysis constrain both
types of simulation.
Both war games and combat/campaign simulations involve clients, designers,
developers, and analysts employing informal reasoning processes and subjective
judgment in creating their theory of the world under study. The totality of the
participants, models, and data employed in these simulations and the relationships among them represent the theory of the war game or combat/campaign
simulation. In the case of games, this includes the role players, umpires, and
control team, in addition to any quantitative models used in adjudication. In
combat/campaign simulation, it involves the treatment of human decision and
the concepts and information conditions embedded in the models, as well as the
flow of outcomes from one process into the next (e.g., who attacked whom first).
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
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The motivations, expertise, tastes, beliefs, and reliability of all human participants involved in the pseudoexperiment are thus integral, intrinsic parts of the
subject matter, and therefore parts of the theory expressed in the war game or
combat/campaign simulation.
Given the subjective judgment involved in defining the world and assessing its
true state in both forms of pseudoexperimentation, objectivity comes from intersubjectivity. For combat/campaign models, this involves techniques such as the
use of models that have shown value in actual combat (e.g., those developed using
combat data in war) or that have been verified in field/fleet exercises employing actual forces. A weaker, but essential, form of verification for assessing the
objectivity of scenarios, models, and data is to open them to debate and review—
realizing that “sunlight is the best disinfectant”51—while recognizing the pitfalls
that may result from political logrolling. Interpreting the structure of relationships in and among models and how to sequence these models in pseudoexperiments relies on the subjective judgment of the developers. It also requires developers who know what factors are indeed relevant to the world under study; e.g.,
attacking air forces on the ground can be a way to gain dominance of the air.52
Operational experience is useful in developing the expertise to make such judgments. Gaming has an advantage in this regard: “In operational gaming, the simulated environment is particularly effective in reminding the expert, in his[/her]
role as a player, to take all the factors into account . . . that are potentially relevant; for if he[/she] does not, and chooses a tactic or strategy which overlooks
an essential factor, an astute ‘opponent’ will soon enough teach him[/her] not to
make such an omission again.”53 “People sensitive to a variety of responsibilities
collaborate, applying the criteria that are relevant to their own interests, making
estimates that reflect their own kinds of knowledge, and putting themselves in
a mood to worry about probabilities rather than just a list of possibilities. They
really live through a simulated crisis and not only learn things about their plans
and their predictions but learn something about the nature of crisis.”54
Gaming allows all participants—role players, control team, umpires—the right
of reclama when they need additional information for a decision or question the
adjudication of a move. Manual games are particularly useful in this regard. In
manual games (which may employ computer calculation in adjudication), players
must make decisions from one turn to the next, taking into account the current
situation; and procedures used to evaluate the consequences of the players’ decisions must be quite clear to the players—simple enough for them to understand.55
Gaming achieves objectivity by allowing all experts involved to share both
their formal and informal reasoning explicitly and openly. Deficits in knowledge
and both consensus and dispute are evident, thus providing a foundation for
further inquiry. Critiques provide ways to improve the games continually. By
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contrast, the details of combat/campaign simulations are evident only to the
analyst/team that developed the simulation or to someone willing to conduct a
detailed study of the data and models used in the simulation.
In all science, good practice calls for independent review. However, in this
field the practice is difficult to follow owing to the additional costs and the limitations that security and proprietary concerns impose. Clients often use “need to
know” as an excuse to hold details of the pseudoexperiments close. Often, when a
contractor performs the analysis, the details of the pseudoexperiment are proprietary. The Operations Research Society of America promulgated “Guidelines for
the Practice of Operations Research” as a consequence of a dispute in testimony
to Congress over two studies of ballistic-missile defense that supported conflicting recommendations. The guidelines conclude as follows:
The analyst, as analyst, must restrict his[/her] analysis to the quantifiable and logically structural aspects of the problem only. In complex problems, perhaps the most
valuable thing the analyst can do is to point out to his[/her] client that there are
uncertainties deriving from such factors as:
• Lack of agreement on means of evaluating the worth of complex systems.
• Uncertainty about the technical capabilities and costs of systems yet unbuilt.
• Uncertainty about environmental and operational factors that influence
performance.
• Uncertainty about the future capabilities or intentions of possible opposition.
The analyst should be prepared to engage in dialogue with the client and other advisors to consider how other value systems, assumptions, and conditions might influence conclusions. . . . The analyst’s job, especially in tough policy questions,
is to analyze and help illuminate, and this means having the qualities of humility
and openness necessary to participate in open dialogue with the client and other
advisors.56

Subjective judgment enters once more in deciding what actions to take as a
result of the war game or combat/campaign simulation. Here again, gaming has
an advantage in that those who will decide what actions to take (or those on their
staffs) have participated in the experiment—the decision makers learn directly
from the game experience. In contrast, in the case of a combat/campaign simulation, decisions on actions to take depend on how the analyst/team used subjective
judgment to frame and report the results, adding another layer of interpretation
to the decision process.
A critique of games is that the subjective judgments of the experts involved
make them irreproducible. A question for combat/campaign simulation is
whether, given the same subject matter, independent teams would select the same
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scenarios, models, data, structures, and relationships, among them producing the
same results and the same analysis on the basis of those results. A 1973 General
Accounting Office (GAO) report following promulgation of the Operations Research Society of America’s “Guidelines for the Practice of Operations Research”
found shortfalls in independent checks to ensure the accuracy, timeliness, consistency, and overall quality of the data—about 18 percent of the models were
considered generally transferable for use by another person or another site—and
“[t]he choices of scenarios, equipment performance, and personnel operations
are based somewhat upon unknowns and uncertainties. The extent that the
model reflects the real-world situation depends on the accuracy of the modelbuilders’ judgment.”57
Relying on intersubjectivity generates concerns centering on the role of bias
in forming belief. Critiques of limitations on human judgment and decision are
legion. Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann provide a framework for how people make
decisions (unconflicted adherence, unconflicted change, defensive avoidance,
hypervigilance—as with a crowd heading for the exits in an emergency—and
vigilance).58 Even vigilant decision making may be subject to cognitive, egocentric (self-serving motives), or affiliative (organizational or social acceptability)
constraints.59 Charles Pierce provides a set of methods for fixing belief similar to
those above, including tenacity (such as a child hears from its mother), authority
(the will of an institution), apriority (the adoption of self-evident assumptions
that are clear to the user, but to no one else), and finally the method of science.60
Humans are exceptionally poor at assessing subjective probabilities.61 “When we
pit [political] experts against minimalist performance benchmarks—dilettantes,
dart-throwing chimps, and assorted extrapolation algorithms—we find few signs
that expertise translates into greater ability to make either ‘well-calibrated’ or
‘discriminating’ forecasts.”62 Humans make decisions on the basis of their tastes
(preferences) and beliefs (subjective probabilities).63 They persist in even discredited beliefs. The Central Intelligence Agency provides four reasons for this
persistence: “We tend to perceive what we expect to perceive; mind sets tend to
be quick to form but resistant to change; new information is assimilated to existing images; and initial exposure to blurred or ambiguous stimuli interferes with
accurate perception even after more and better information becomes available.”64
However, “[w]hether a distortion common to all can nevertheless be said to
yield something objective is a philosophical question that has no bearing on the
conduct of the human enterprise of science. The methodological question is
always limited to whether what is reported as an observation can be used in subsequent inquiry even if the particular observer is no longer part of the context.”65
Thus, for objectivity, the analytical team / rapporteurs in war gaming should
note the assumptions and design choices that went into the game, arguments
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both for and against a particular course of action by teams making their decisions, and what outcome the team hoped to achieve, capturing both consensus
and disputes. Objectivity in combat/campaign simulation involves using models
validated by observation of operations or field/fleet exercises, employing data
collected from those exercises. Studies done in advance of actual operations
should be compared with what transpired and why.66 Analysts of both war games
and combat/campaign simulations should keep in mind the motivations and
beliefs of the participants and should extract from the experiment that which
subsequent inquiry could verify or refute.
Rigor. Aristotle said, “A well-schooled man is one who searches for that degree of
precision in each kind of study which the nature of the subject at hand admits.”
Kaplan goes on to note, “Another failing of models—more accurately, of model
builders—consists in an undue emphasis on exactness and rigor.”67 Used in this
way, rigor too often is equated to precise quantification, usually in the form of
increasing the number of significant figures relative to a decimal point. However,
the tests of rigor are whether (1) the analytical techniques used are appropriate to
the subject matter, (2) we can articulate clearly the details of the method used and
how we arrived at conclusions, and ultimately (3) we can state what valid lessons
the study produced. Employing analytical techniques that provide overly exact
answers that do not reflect the uncertainties and indeterminacy inherent in the
subject matter are not rigorous.
Rigor is related closely to objectivity. It demands careful attention to the design of a war game or combat/campaign simulation to achieve the objectivity
described above. It also requires efforts to understand the quality of data used in
quantitative models, estimating the range of uncertainty in quantitative results,
and framing conclusions in quasi law–like statements that reflect the consensus
and disagreement of those involved in the pseudoexperiment. New understandings of chaos and complexity also raise questions regarding the treatment of human action in combat simulations.
A first test of rigor is the data used in quantitative and semantic modeling. The
most reliable data are collected during operations or exercises that are essentially
the same as those represented in the model. Operations research originated during World War II with the collection of data, then the use of those data to develop
models of the operation under study.68 Many of those models and the modeling
techniques have persisted, but sustained efforts to collect data at sea or in the field
are now rare. The 1973 GAO study found that in 85 percent of the cases submitted to the researchers, DoD activities used data obtained from sources other than
field exercises or actual experience.69
Beginning with its World War II experience involving malfunctioning torpedoes, the U.S. submarine force began collecting data on every torpedo fired.
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When tasked with creating an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability in 1949,
Submarine Development Group 2 developed a process of designing exercises to
test technology and tactics, collecting data on system and platform (including
crew) performance during those exercises, using the submarine approach and attack manual to standardize the data, and reconstructing the exercises to quantify
the results.70 Using this process, the submarine force went from having essentially
no ASW capability in 1949 to having the world’s premier ASW capability in 1969.
The process led to continual improvement of the search and combat models used
in war games and combat/campaign simulations. At-sea exercises discovered
and corrected errors in search models implemented on computers.71 The Navy
used a similar approach in its Tactical Development and Evaluation Program and
some equipment-development programs in the 1970s and ’80s.72 However, oddly
enough—given accelerating demands for data—as computer simulation became
more popular in the Pentagon for platform and weapon systems analysis (what
DoD calls program analysis), emphasis on prototyping equipment and collecting data on processes and performance at sea and in the field waned. Structured
operational testing and evaluation for systems in development largely replaced
mission-oriented operations analysis involving all aspects of the system’s use and
its effectiveness as one of a suite of systems.
Recent efforts to return to the roots of operations research have encountered
difficulties. During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, initiatives to put analytical teams
into the field were severely limited by commanders’ concerns about protecting
the analysts—and controlling the data. Although we have been fighting in that
region for a decade and a half, data on processes and performance from the field
have not been the source for modeling and experimentation that they were in
World War II.
The majority of friendly-force data used in computer-based combat/campaign
simulation come from structured operational testing and evaluation of system
performance (which may or may not reflect its performance in actual field/
fleet use, with different concepts of employment) or from expectations of future
system performance based on key performance parameters used for design.
However, data from structured tests have not proved reliable. In World War II,
“experimental results overestimated the casualty production rate for tanks by a
factor of two; for artillery duels by a factor of three; and for pure infantry actions
by a factor of seven.” 73 Given the human penchant for survival and the fog and
friction of war, structured tests provide overly optimistic estimates.
Lest you think we are better off now with modern computers and powerful algorithms built into our best models, here is a more recent example. The U.S. Navy
depends mightily for defense of the fleet on the Aegis missile system. Using data from
controlled experiments at sea, one may calculate that if you shoot two missiles at an
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incoming missile and they are operationally and statistically independent of each other, and if you also add some point defense, you can expect to shoot down 90 percent
or more of the attacking anti-ship cruise missiles. What is the combat record? First,
in battles at sea warships of other states have averaged around 75 percent success in
defending themselves. On the other hand, all of their success must be attributed to
soft kill and point defense weapons, not to surface-to-air missiles [SAMs]. Second,
there are several instances of warships that might have defended themselves but did
not, illustrated by the recent successful missile attack on the Israeli missile ship Hanit.
Navy analysts will also remember the Exocet hits on the defendable USS Stark and
HMS Sheffield. Third, in the entire record of over 220 missiles fired on ships at sea
starting in 1967, only one anti-ship missile has been shot down by a SAM.74

Models predicted the United States would incur thirty thousand casualties in
Operation DESERT STORM, not the roughly three hundred that actually occurred;
and half of those casualties did not occur in battle.75 Models for casualty estimates
almost never include friendly fire. Even when friendly-force data are available
in a combat model, factors such as the reliability and effectiveness of allied and
adversary weapons, the proficiency of an adversary in using counterfire or countermeasures that depend on the adversary’s training, etc., must be estimated. Key
data disputes “often center around order of battle, unit effectiveness, munitions
quantities, chemical warfare performance degrade values, advance rates, sortie
rates, and concepts of operation [CONOPS]. More time is spent instantiating and
refining CONOPS information than systems performance data. Hence the obvious utility of wargames to understand CONOPS and the flow of the warfight.”76
In World War II, the operations evaluation groups determined that a simple
estimate of the error in a model is the individual percentage error of the data times
the square root of the number of data elements. For a model with five thousand
data entries and a tight error range of 10 percent, this equates to a factor of seven.77 The 1973 GAO report found that 27 percent of the models they examined
had over ten thousand coded instructions. Campaign models that DoD currently
uses typically have on the order of one hundred thousand data elements and
hundreds of equations and semantic models establishing the relationships among
the data elements. Mistakes in the internal validity of computer models resulting
from treating continuous functions as discrete and stipulating relationships for
which no theory or data exist to allow computation compound the errors in the
final calculation.78 Adding detail to a combat/campaign simulation may or may
not improve the rigor, but it surely will increase the uncertainty of the calculation.
Understanding this principle, the members of the World War II Operations
Evaluation Group used a hemibel (half a decibel, or a factor of about three)
rule. If they could not demonstrate factor-of-three improvements in a recommended change, they were uncertain that they had sufficient accuracy to merit
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the recommendation, particularly considering the time and costs involved in
changing operational practices. At a recent Military Operations Research Society
workshop, a section leader informed me that military operations research no
longer uses the hemibel rule. Why not is unclear.
The use of combat models to adjudicate war games is subject to the same
concerns as is their use in campaign simulations. However, employing models
that participants can question and umpires can explain adds both objectivity and
rigor to the enterprise.
Whereas combat/campaign simulation requires the analyst/team to represent all indeterminacy as statistical, war gaming specifically addresses strategic
and structural indeterminacy. Strategic indeterminacy means that the outcome
largely is determined by the interaction of role-player decisions and the adjudication of control/umpires (who may be considered additional actors). Structural indeterminacy involves uncertainties in appropriately bounding the subject under
study, determining which elements are relevant to include in characterizing the
state of the world, and understanding the relationships among those elements.
Manual games are good for the following:
• study of partially understood dynamic processes
• study of partially understood force interactions
• building of players’ backgrounds for future study and analysis
• continual game improvement on the basis of players’ criticisms79
Where the fundamental character of the subject under study involves strategic
and structural indeterminacy, war-gaming techniques are more appropriate than
combat/campaign simulation. Adding the data and formalities needed for computation detracts from, rather than adds to, rigor.
Usefulness and Value. The final criterion for science under exploration is the
value or usefulness of the study or, in our case, the pseudoexperiment. Usefulness is the ability to use the experiment to take appropriate action. It presumes
objectivity and rigor.
DoD turned to computer-based combat/campaign simulation because it desired methods that could produce rapid, objective, rigorous simulations to examine contingencies involving different adversaries to predict force requirements,
study strategic/operational concepts, and compare costs and effects of alternative
new platforms or weapons systems. DoD found these simulations useful in providing a common basis for making comparisons on a timeline consistent with
annual program and budget development.
However, the “method of Monte Carlo [or any other form of combat/cam
paign simulation] has one particular value: its educative or intuition-building
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol70/iss1/5
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effect on those who behold the actual performance of the process. It allows the
results of experimental variations of certain factors of the situation to be perceived in a direct and life-like way. This appearance of realism is so great that
it has often led observers to forget that they were not in fact observing nature
directly: a disastrous error.”80
The predictive value of a large-scale, complicated combat/campaign computer simulation depends on how the analyst/team represents the results. Good,
scientific analysis of computer-based campaign simulation can support quasi
laws such as the identification of governing factors, but not strictly statistical or
deterministic answers. Also, the premise that changing the characteristics of one
system while leaving the rest of the world the same can determine an outcome
assumes no feedback between the change and the rest of the system (e.g., that
a change in combat capability will not influence commanders’ decisions and
CONOPS). However, DoD’s use of computer-based simulation seeks to predict
outcomes rather than to develop deep understanding of the factors governing the
outcomes of battles and campaigns. Rarely do reports address governing factors
or attempt to quantify the uncertainties inherent in the simulation.81
When DoD clients are facing a decision, telling them that their simulation
identified topics that require future study is rarely what they want to hear. However, failure to identify unresolved issues from the pseudoexperiment obfuscates
important uncertainties that should be considered. Science values the so-called
heuristic fertility of studies rich in implications for further observations, experiment, or conceptualization.82
Making predictions from games presents challenges similar to making predictions from combat/campaign simulations, with the added proviso that although
there is widespread skepticism about accepting any prediction of human behavior
—much less quantified predictions—from a game, predictions derived from
computer models are widely accepted. Yet although experts making stand-alone
predictions are unreliable, “[e]xperience has shown that people often tend to
adopt the same solutions to similar problems. Insofar as this is true, a realistic war
game may predict the future, or at least some aspects of it[,] quite accurately.”83
Where games have preceded military battles and campaigns, they have demonstrated value in anticipating adversary tactics and courses of action and the
many governing factors needed to prosecute battles and campaigns successfully.
Examples include the following:
• Naval War College (NWC) games anticipating tactics in the Russo-Japanese
War
• battle of Tannenberg gaming by both the Russian and German general staffs
• German general staff gaming of the Schlieffen Plan before World War I
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• gaming different strategic approaches for a war with Japan at the College
between the world wars
• Japanese gaming of the battle of Midway
• NWC gaming of the naval mining campaign against the Japanese in World
War II
• German and Russian general staffs gaming the German invasion of Russia
(Operation BARBAROSSA) in World War II
• Israelis’ gaming before their operations
• U.S. Joint Staff gaming in anticipation of North Vietnam’s Tet offensive
In almost all these cases, the games accurately predicted factors driving the
success of future operations. However, in many cases the military system was
unable to adapt in a timely fashion or the games had no effect on the political
leadership conducting the war. Sometimes senior military leaders rejected game
results.84
The Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group (CNO SSG) conducted
a game exploring the implications of an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in February
1990, before the actual invasion in August. Although the game had Iraqi forces
advancing into Saudi Arabia toward the oil fields, otherwise it accurately anticipated a need for nontraditional coalitions, challenges in strategic lift, and the
inadequate numbers of precision weapons on deployed Navy forces, among other
things.85 Yet many senior officials briefed on the game in March 1990 expressed
no interest, viewing Iran rather than Iraq as the adversary of concern. Requests
for game documents increased as Iraq conducted the invasion.
“Gaming is a powerful method for simultaneously mastering complexity, enhancing communication, stimulating creativity, and contributing to consensus
and a commitment to action.”86 Thomas C. Schelling found the following: “First,
the games are intensely stimulating; people are very active; ideas and conjectures
get tossed around and analysed by a highly motivated group of people; a great
deal of expertise is collected in a single room, expertise that is not often collected together; and people discover facts, ideas, possibilities, capabilities, and
arguments that do not in any way depend on the game but nevertheless emerge
in it.” Players discover important facts that may never have occurred to them or
are counter to what they understood (e.g., unprecedented acts excite attention,
jurisdictional seams, and overlaps), and ways that players not represented in their
usual thinking affect the feasibility and acceptability of possible courses of action.
[T]he game, as a social and intellectual occasion, tends to be highly productive of little
things of this sort. . . .
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Second, people . . . learn more . . . about a country, by going through a game . . .
than by any cram course [of equivalent time]. . . . If somebody were going to be responsible for some operations in the Pacific Islands, or were going to be Deputy Chief
of Mission in Finland, or going to run an [Agency for International Development]
program in Cyprus, just putting him[/her] into a game for three days focused on the
area he[/she] is going to would teach him[/her] more than he[/she] could get by any
kind of briefings, lectures, reading program, or other program of self-improvement.

Third, acquaintance is made with people with whom one might have occasion to
work in the future involving intense common experience in joint problem solving. These by-products are just preliminary to costs. People can spend the other
362 days of the year pursuing other forms of analysis and learning. “All analytical
techniques, all research methods, all stimulants to the imagination are dangerous. This includes games. But games are not much worse in this regard than the
other techniques.”87
A critique of current professional military education is that it does not give
officers a detailed appreciation of military geography in theaters of interest or of
adversaries’ weapons systems and their concepts for using them. Theater-level
games are valuable for learning geography, including the military geography of
basing; the kinds and ranges of adversary and allied forces that may come into
play and the complications they represent; and the logic of adversary concepts,
as represented by Red teams. At the tactical level, war games are good for teaching junior officers the capabilities of adversary forces in an experiential way that
tends to stick better than reading intelligence reports.88 As the Prussian and German militaries recognized, games are exceptionally useful for developing an appreciation of command relationships and skills in writing orders and in working
through control of forces in complicated situations.
Between the world wars, the German army (Wehrmacht) conducted field
exercises during the summer and gamed when in garrison the rest of the year.
During winter, each echelon, from the general staff to the company level, gamed
their roles in the operations contemplated, then took what they gamed to the field
the next year, beginning with company-level exercises and culminating, usually
in August, in as large-scale an exercise as they could manage. With the army restricted in size by treaty, the games aimed to teach each rank, career enlisted and
officer, how to perform at two ranks senior so the army could expand quickly.
During war, these games became rehearsals for upcoming operations and occasionally continued as battles were being fought. The games were of great value to
the Wehrmacht for developing concepts such as the blitzkrieg, and for developing
its operational competence when it had sufficient forces to retain the initiative.89
The interaction of experts trying to achieve opposing aims within the context
provided in the scenario helps ensure that relevant factors are not overlooked.
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Games provide a basis of shared experience and a common vocabulary.90 Whereas creativity of the analyst in combat/campaign simulation is reflected in the
coding and analysis, the Markov assumption does not allow for learning during
the game. Including learning algorithms (e.g., Bayesian calculations) in the code
further complicates analysis of the results. In war games, the role players adapt to
each state of the world, as provided by game umpires and control. Courses of action that do not provide desired results lead to reexamining possible approaches
and objectives. New ideas that do work become apparent to all participants, contributing to the consensus needed to generate commitment to a course of action.
Concerns over the appearance of realism in gaming represent the same risks and
unintended consequences as those resulting from combat/campaign modeling.91
The scope of issues amenable to war gaming exceeds that of combat/campaign
simulation. Manual war gaming is uniquely suited to increasing our understanding of and appreciation for the information dimension of warfare.92 Ultimately,
military operations are about influence: deterring or compelling change in others’
actions inconsistent with one’s political aims, while reassuring and encouraging
others’ actions that are consistent with one’s political aims. The critical feature
of a game, as opposed to computer modeling or any other forms of one-sided
analysis,
is that at least two separate decision centers are involved, neither of which is privy to
the other’s planning and arguing, neither of which has complete access to the other’s
intelligence or background information, neither of which has any direct way of knowing everything that the other is deciding on. . . . What this mode of organization can
do that can not otherwise be done is to generate the phenomena of understanding
and misunderstanding, perception and misperception, bargaining, demonstrations,
dares and challenger’s [sic], accommodation, coercion and intimidation, conveyance
of intent, and uncertainty about what each other has already done or decided on. . . .
. . . If I draw a face with a hidden picture there is no way for me to tell how hard it is
to see the face except to show the picture to somebody. . . .
It is the peculiar element of collaboration, communication, and bargaining, that is
involved in any crisis game, that cannot be captured by “straightforward” unilateral
analysis. . . .
. . . [I]n arguments about the treasures or dangers that one may stumble on in games
it is significant that there is at least something that games can do or generate that cannot be done or generated in any other way.93

Another value is that those who participate in a pseudoexperiment learn far
more than those who receive a report of the study’s findings. Few clients have the
time or technical ability to understand the internal details of the combat/campaign simulation; they instead rely on their analytical teams to distill key findings
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relevant to the objectives of the study. In contrast, war gaming facilitates participation by those who must make and implement decisions. Joint planning dictates
that, ideally, “the individuals who were deeply involved in the development of the
COAs [courses of action]” should participate in the gaming used to develop those
COAs.94 War gaming facilitates recognition-primed decision making that allows
commanders and their staffs to adapt rapidly to emerging situations, using their
experiences in games “demanding careful sequential analysis of plans, decisions,
events, and intelligence.”95
IMPLICATIONS FOR DOD ANALYSIS AND A WAY AHEAD
The principal implication of this assessment is that DoD should overhaul its
analytical paradigm that began with the Systems Analysis Office and evolved
with the development of computers. DoD should rely on talented analysts and
not again make the mistake of attempting to create universal answer machines
through standardized processes and techniques. The focus of analysis for acquisition and force development should shift from individual weapons systems to capabilities to conduct sets of missions. DoD should reinvigorate the examination
of warfare and military operations to develop an appreciation of fundamental
questions to focus analysis, balancing a marketplace of ideas and approaches with
the instincts of its hierarchy to centralize planning. It then should employ analysis campaigns, using cycles of research focused on top decision makers’ concerns,
that incorporate the following:
• war gaming
• DoD’s investment in large-scale campaign models, to develop intuition and
help identify factors governing combat outcomes
• field/fleet operations analysis
• intelligence collection
• campaign analysis
• quantitative modeling using simple, understandable models that incorporate
only governing factors derived from observation and analysis (as opposed to
creating computer code for each combat process and adding more code to
already complicated models to address new technologies and phenomena)
• the study of history and recent advances in complexity sciences, and complementary analytical techniques based on advances in artificial intelligence
and cognitive and social sciences
• review of study results against actual operations
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No new analysis paradigm can meet scientific standards without addressing
the roadblocks created by the abuse of need-to-know strictures and proprietary
control of analyses.
Avoiding Past Mistakes
With the recent policy to make more use of war gaming, the first principle for
a way forward should be to avoid mistakes of the past. Efforts to use large-scale
computer modeling to create universal answer machines were misguided. In its
search for systematic analysis routines, the natural tendency of the Pentagon will
be to create similar standardized systems of war gaming that would allow those
developing procurement programs and strategists to “turn the crank” to address
issues as they arise. However, even the most objective and rigorous efforts in the
past have not produced the desired results, as the following examples indicate.
RAND Strategy Assessment System. In the 1980s, concerns over the ability to
analyze a possible war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact leading to a nuclear
exchange motivated the OSD Office of Net Assessment to sponsor RAND in developing the RAND Strategy Assessment System (RSAS). The approach was to
combine the best features of war gaming and analytical modeling in a comprehensive, farsighted framework for comparing views rigorously and moving toward
some conclusions. RAND formed a stellar team to do the work, led by Paul Davis.
To this effort, war gaming provided the following:
• the contextual richness of complete scenarios
• interaction of political and military factors
• operational constraints
• often-ignored features of real war (e.g., unconventional attacks against
command-and-control communications)
• asymmetries in objectives and perceptions
• asymmetries in national forces, doctrines, and styles
• relatively realistic descriptions of military campaigns
• action and reaction among the nations involved in the conflict
Analytical modeling provided the following:
• clarity of assumptions and causality
• reproducibility
• logical structure and rigor
• efficiency, permitting many war games (multiscenario analysis)
• depersonalization, by laying issues out on paper logically96
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To make gaming more efficient and rigorous, the RSAS approach used AI
techniques to replace human teams. To make the process transparent, the design permitted human interaction at all levels, with the exception of some core
model and execution coding. The intent was not to eliminate the role of expert
judgment but “to capture most of the human-expert contribution in background
research reflected in the models.”97 Computer code was written so that analysts
knowledgeable in the subject matter did not need to have extensive experience
to read and program decision rules.98 The team intended that analysts and senior
decision makers would be able to get definitive explanations and have the opportunity to change assumptions readily.
Departures from traditional analysis included automated game-based simulation to permit multiscenario analysis, heuristic rule-based modeling to make
explicit the key assumptions on which outcomes depend, structured military
campaign analysis, and interactive force-operations modeling. This would enable
the analysis to treat interrelationships among strategic and nonstrategic forces;
cut across theater boundaries, military services, and types of warfare; and reflect
the effects of special phenomena such as unconventional warfare and failures in
command and control.99 The aim was not to predict outcomes but to understand
what affected outcomes most.
In 1986, government agencies received the first installations of RSAS. An
RSAS Steering Group, consisting of sponsors, developers, and users, approved
requests to use the system. Although the RAND team intended that actual decision makers use the system for policy analysis, it proved too complicated to be
of use in evaluating immediate operational situations, and high-level decision
makers turned to their own analysts. RSAS was open to review, critique, and
improvement. The challenge was that it was akin to an engineering library. One
could investigate any subject, but only the developers could comprehend the
whole system.100
As a spin-off from RSAS, RAND developed the Joint Integrated Contingency
Model (JICM). It designed the model to be modular for transparency and to
avoid needing to add hundreds of thousands of input variables. “As the model
[JICM] was used in later years, however, the optional simplicity fell into disuse as
users focused on getting the detailed databases ‘right’ (meaning agreed upon) for
running standardized cases.”101
Although RSAS and JICM were as objective, rigorous, and comprehensive as
was practical, the limited interests and capacity of the DoD bureaucracy defeated
RAND’s sophisticated efforts to meet exacting standards of science.
Joint Warfare System. In a subsequent effort to allay concerns over the services
using their own scenarios, models, and data, in the 1990s OSD began funding
the Joint Warfare System (JWARS) to “support multi-billion dollar resource
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allocation decisions and critical operational planning.” JWARS was “a closedform analytic simulation” using deterministic and stochastic models, including
information operations, and “high-level abstractions of sensor and communications systems, the related information flows, imperfect perception of the battlespace, and command decision making.”102 The aim, as with individual service
campaign simulations, has been to create a simulation to determine the effects of
varying the characteristics of a system or concept by turning a crank, leaving the
rest of the simulation unperturbed.
Given the expansiveness of the state space, the use of models and data based
on judgment rather than observations from operations or exercises, and the likely
feedback among systems characteristics and concepts, this approach involves
large uncertainties that are difficult to quantify. As Koopman stated, “Rightly
employed, it [combat simulation] gives a useful indicator in evaluations; it can
never be relied on to predict the future.”103 JWARS was expensive, yet could not
accomplish the vision of those who conceived and advocated for it.
Analytic Agenda / Support to Strategic Analysis. Given the expense and challenges of JWARS, in 2002 Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld created an
Analytic Agenda (now called Support to Strategic Analysis—SSA) to transform
DoD’s analysis system supporting strategic and programmatic decision making.
The Analytic Agenda was a set of activities designed to do the following:
• Articulate, through scenarios, the secretary’s guidance to the department
about the missions, environments, and threats for which the future force
should be prepared.
• Apply joint concepts to future missions depicted in planning scenarios.
• Produce standardized, accessible, transparent data and common assumptions for department-wide use in analysis.
• Design and conduct major joint analyses to support decisions on force structure, investments, and capability trade-offs.104
This effort did result in scenarios for analysis approved by DoD leadership,
and it created conferences at which the services met to agree on common datasets
they would use in their analyses. Each service was assured of having one of its
preferred scenarios included. The services also used their preferred “all-purpose”
campaign simulations for their capability-development processes, incorporating
data beyond that in the common datasets as needed. However, few of these data
came from detailed analyses of operations and exercises. These efforts have had
little impact on cross-service force structure investments or capability trade-offs.
The details of studies done using these simulations are classified and proprietary, limiting opportunities for review of their objectivity and rigor. OSD, the
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Joint Staff, and the services should take care not to create a similar, highly structured set of expensive, complex, proprietary war games.
No defense problem is specified well enough that an optimum can be calculated
without employing subjective judgment to establish values. The large campaign
simulations used for SSA result in large sets of feasible courses of action. Expecting large combat/campaign simulations or war games to resolve conflicting preferences among institutional forces within the military-industrial-congressional
enterprise that drive the defense program and budget is illogical.105 Improvements to JWARS or the SSA are incapable of providing the precise predictions for
resolving complicated and complex defense issues that those who misunderstand
scientific rigor expect. “As one goes up the scale of complexity, the personal qualities of the analyst shift from scientific to artistic and his[/her] model from precise
to abstract. That is why asking me which model to buy is asking the wrong question. Instead, ask me which analysts and modelers to hire.”106
Capabilities-Based Planning
DoD’s acquisition system, which consumes the vast majority of the Pentagon’s
attention and analytical effort, focuses on major defense acquisition programs—
platforms and systems that involve the commitment of billions of dollars.107 Under Secretary Rumsfeld, DoD attempted to introduce capabilities-based planning
as a means of putting the development of individual weapons systems in context.
Capabilities-based planning has received rough treatment in recent reviews for
being tied to the revolution in military affairs and force transformation, focusing on concepts such as net-centric warfare rather than on strategy to defeat the
strategies and forces of identified potential adversaries. These critiques largely
miss the mark.108
The usual driver for acquisition is that an aircraft, vehicle, or vessel is reaching
the point where it is expensive to maintain or upgrade with new technology, and
a military service proposes to replace that platform with a new one incorporating the latest generation of technology. A 1992 study of the cost growth of DoD
Major Force Program categories since Secretary McNamara instituted them in
1962 demonstrated that DoD needs 7 percent growth in its budget to maintain
its force structure if it continues attempting to replace each platform with the
latest generation on a one-for-one basis.109 Using the rule of 72, this means that
a 4 percent growth in defense budgets results in halving the force roughly each
quarter of a century.110
Following the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD made an effort to institute “strategic and tactical” acquisition reform.111 A major part of the reform
involved pilot Evaluation of Alternatives on topics such as integrated air and missile defense as a basis for resource allocation, rather than conducting an Analysis
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of Alternatives for each major defense acquisition program. The effort demonstrated promise, but failed when key leaders departed. Also, weapons program
managers wanted to know what the study would show before providing their data
for analysis, despite direction from higher authorities.
If DoD is to overcome its accelerating mismatch between limited budgets and
growing challenges, it requires a new analysis paradigm and a culture focused
more on national security than on protecting parochial service and program
priorities by withholding knowledge and data.
Asking Essential Questions and Selecting Appropriate Methods
Adoption of a new analysis paradigm will involve some time before the paradigm
becomes institutional practice within DoD, and will incur transition costs. DoD
should ensure that initial efforts focus on substantive issues. In the 1950s and
’60s, federally funded research centers led the way in understanding the implications of nuclear weapons for warfare and deterrence. RAND employed Bernard
Brodie, Herman Kahn, Thomas C. Schelling, Albert J. Wohlstetter, and Roberta
M. Wohlstetter, among many other highly talented intellects, to explore fundamental questions of war in the nuclear age, strategy and games, and many other
topics. Now, federally funded research and analysis centers have become principally an extension of Pentagon staff studies. Funding for independent research
on fundamental questions has been eliminated in favor of studying the issue du
jour, which eliminates many fundamental distinctions between federally funded
research centers and for-profit defense contractors. In addition to making better
use of its Office of Net Assessment, which under the leadership of the recently
retired Andrew W. Marshall (who came to OSD from RAND in the 1970s) had a
long history of searching for the right questions, DoD should return to the former model and mission for federally funded research centers, having them help
DoD’s leadership understand the questions they should be asking and the issues
they should analyze.
DoD should realize that the principal value of good analysis is in eliminating infeasible or unsuitable courses of action, and that no analyses can provide
point solutions to complicated problems. Prevailing concepts and political power
among those involved will determine the final trade-offs in defense policy and
plans within the space of feasible and suitable solutions. Centralized processes
that give too much power to one institution, such as OSD or the Joint Staff, are
likely to generate more mistakes than a messier analytical competition among
concepts, methods, and proposed solutions. The Secretaries of Defense must
earn their pay.
That said, different subjects call for different analytical approaches. In turning to war gaming, DoD should avoid the law of the instrument.112 To improve
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rigor, the Military Operations Research Society should assist DoD in developing
guidelines for analysts to align analytical techniques with the fundamental characteristics of subjects under study.
The most appropriate action from pseudoexperimentation, whether war gaming
or combat/computer simulation, is exploring the validity of the findings using
other techniques. Analysis campaigns involve using a variety of techniques to
address important issues. Cycles of research emphasize the interaction among
these techniques as progress in one investigation informs others and is in turn
informed by them.
Learning from RSAS and decades of experience in defense analysis, Davis
recommends analysis campaigns. “The analysis campaign should provide for
breadth with a mix of models, human gaming, historical analysis, trend analysis,
and collaboration with experienced operators,” and should consider multiple
objectives. The approach is to conduct first-cut analyses to narrow the world
under consideration, then to conduct detailed analyses. “Campaign models, for
example—when used with large negotiated databases for only some standard
case—are poor decision aids but are excellent for integration, for understanding
the many facets of a successful large operation, and for building analyst expertise
that is valuable in answering specific questions quickly, often with simpler models.”113 As an example of first-cut analysis considering multiple objectives, Hughes
recommends examining alternative futures.
For example, in determining the best naval forces to influence China and our Asian
allies, it is essential to remember that the same American ships and aircraft, many
of which are built for 30 and even 40 years of combat life, must serve our interests
whether the China-American international relationship at any given moment is
one of cooperation, competition, crisis containment, or conflict at different levels
of intensity. By testing our fleet’s utility in each circumstance we can judge how and
where risks are involved with different fleet compositions and deployment patterns.
The OSD Office of Net Assessment found that looking at alternative futures by region
or economic circumstance was powerful. One did not make predictions about which
future was most likely to come to pass. Instead [one] looked for common forces, solutions, deployments and negotiating positions that were suited for every future.114

Scenario planning has proved an effective technique for resolving structural
indeterminacy.115 Davis provides a comprehensive matrix of instruments (techniques) assessed by important attributes to be considered in an analysis campaign.116 The discussion below represents the author’s appreciation of techniques
essential to cycles of research.
War Gaming and Combat/Campaign Simulation. War gaming and combat/
campaign simulation are complementary to each other. Both provide insight to
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participants on factors governing the contingency under study and issues and
data needing further study. War games are particularly valuable for helping
those employing DoD’s large, computer-based campaign models to understand
CONOPS and the flow of campaigns.117
Fleet/Field Operations Analysis. Games and combat simulation should tie directly to field/fleet exercises experimenting with new concepts, using prototype systems designed to address capability enhancements, and carefully collecting data
to inform important areas of ignorance and assumptions used in plans, games,
and campaign simulation.
The approach and attack manual served as a basis for data collection to
advance U.S. submarine force capabilities rapidly, as did the coordination-indirect-support (CIDS) fleet exercise guide for operational data on fleet communications. The analysis based on these data demonstrated that a CIDS concept
for using submarines as an outer screen for aircraft carriers was infeasible. The
fleet communications data, collected in ten fleet exercises over a two-year period
in the late 1970s, provided the basis for the Warfare Environment Simulator, a
simulation sponsored by Naval Electronics System Command (now the Space
and Naval Warfare Systems Command) focused on command and control. Unfortunately, the Warfare Environment Simulator morphed into the Naval Warfare
Simulation System, losing its focus on using fleet data and on command and
control, instead becoming a large-scale campaign simulation.118
NWC war games served as the basis for developing new operational concepts
to be explored at sea, both before World War II and during the 1980s and ’90s.
Fleet exercises in the 1920s and ’30s turned concepts for amphibious and carrier
air warfare and underway replenishment of naval task forces into key capabilities
for the World War II effort. Fleet exercises in the 1980s translated operational
concepts developed by the CNO SSGs (at the College) into capabilities to execute
the 1980s Maritime Strategy.119 Similarly, in the 1990s, the Navy Warfare Development Command (then collocated at the College) pursued fleet experimentation through a program called Sea Trial. However, the Navy did not sustain that
effort. A debate exists over whether dedicated units are required to conduct such
experimentation. The submarine force since 1949, the Navy Tactical Development and Evaluation Program in the 1970s, and U.S. Pacific Command around
2000 have made experimentation a matter of routine during fleet and joint exercises. Data collected from routine rather than structured exercises better represents what would occur in unstructured combat and operations.
As part of war-gaming initiatives, OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services should
reinvigorate field/fleet experimentation and embed operations analysts in deployed battalions and carrier strike groups and on higher-echelon staffs to collect
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data on operations and exercises. For large programs and issues, exercise and
operations analysis guides using conceptual processes would provide consistent
datasets for analysis and use in pseudoexperimentation. Those educated in engineering and the hard sciences are likely to perform in the field as well as or better
than those educated in operations research curricula emphasizing mathematical
programming (optimization) and stochastic processes.120
Cyber warfare should receive particular attention, given current challenges in
creating operational models. Beyond Red teams, white hats should experiment
in the field with what it would take to turn unmanned systems into kamikazes attacking their host forces, for example, before making large investment decisions.
Intelligence Collection. War games also should be tied to intelligence collection
and analysis. While military intelligence naturally tends to focus on possible adversary technical capabilities (e.g., range and accuracy of weapons), war games
require Red teams that understand adversary planning, training, ethos, and operational concepts. Similarly, war games also suggest adversary courses of action that would create difficulty for the Blue team. Therefore, war-game findings
should play into intelligence requirements to determine whether adversaries have
identified and are preparing to execute such courses of action.
Campaign Analysis. Rather than using war games or large campaign models that
require significant amounts of time to set up, rapid, focused analyses on the eve
of war have demonstrated value in anticipating important outcomes. Shortly before each war began, Captain/Professor Wayne Hughes gave Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS) students seventy-two hours to analyze the Falklands War between
the United Kingdom and Argentina, the wars in Afghanistan, and the wars in
Iraq. These analyses all provided results that would have been valuable to the
commanders involved.121 The key is selecting appropriate measures for quantification. Selecting appropriate analytical measures begins with developing an appreciation for the principal factors governing outcomes, and often is not done
well.122
What useful results reasonably can be expected from war gaming and rapid
campaign analysis, since accurate results cannot be expected? At NPS, Hughes
teaches the students in his joint campaign analysis course that these war-gaming
and campaign analyses provide the following:
• patterns of activity, both tactical and operational; the reward of new tactics
to accompany new technology
• a focusing by decision makers and their staffs on the important things—
those most likely to influence the outcome and achieve “victory,” or whatever
the intended outcome is
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• synthesized information about almost anything: the traffic, the places of
concealment, the beaches, the mountain passes to block, the critical roads, or
the vital bridges to protect or destroy; and, perhaps most important because
it is calculable, the time to arrive on scene and the logistical support necessary to sustain operations
• advice to the decision maker that is quantitative, objective, informed,
specific—and incomplete
• unexpected side benefits; for example, in designing a warship one might discover that it is not a good idea to put too many eggs in one basket if the ship
can be lost while performing a dangerous task123
Observe that predicting outcomes, or even winners by some criterion, does
not appear on the list. Hughes is a great proponent of campaign analysis and its
value—if one does not claim too much predictive power from it. Decisions have
to be made amid uncertainty, and informed decisions are better than those based
on individual experience and personal predilections alone.124
Simple versus Large Combat Models. Good analysis derives from understanding
those few essential features of the subject under study that govern an outcome.125
Although using models to understand essential features is valuable, attempting
to predict outcomes by adding ever more detail without considering the implications for additional uncertainty is antithetical to analysis. Campaign analyses
and manual war games employing simple, focused combat models and rules that
are understood and subject to question by all participants can expose the factors
that govern success—i.e., those on which commanders and capability developers
should focus.
Barring a more exact method for quantifying the uncertainty of a combat
simulation, the analyst should estimate the typical error involved in the variables
used in the models, multiply that times the square root of the number of variables, and present and report the result as the range of uncertainty in the quantitative findings. Although simulations are of great value in providing insights to
analysts, analysts should be appropriately humble in recommending program or
policy changes solely on the basis of the outcomes of their models.
Complexity Sciences. Advances in complexity sciences raise questions regarding
current combat models and present new opportunities for defense analyses. The
combat models used in war gaming and campaign simulations were developed
before more recent improvements in understanding chaos and complexity. Chaos
involves sensitivity to initial conditions on a space of measure zero. In a space of
measure zero, no matter how precise an interval, area, or n-dimensional volume
around an initial state, there exist points that will result in far different future
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states of the system. A pendulum hung amid three magnets—such as Clausewitz described in explaining the pulls of government (reason), the population
(primordial violence), and the military (chance) in war—is such a chaotic system. Classical physics and statistics, as discussed above, presume that describing the initial state allows prediction of future states, at least with probabilities.
The foundations for statistics on spaces of measure zero are not well understood.
Mathematics based on continuity does not apply in chaotic and in many complex
systems.
Complexity involves power laws. Power laws have a mean, but unlike Poisson
or Gaussian distributions, their standard distribution is infinity.126 The law of
large numbers does not apply to power laws. Power laws apply to phenomena
such as earthquakes—and to much of human behavior that involves bursts of
activity.127 Historically, a small number of pilots and submarine commanders account for the most kills. Is this a power law? If so, how do combat models account
for the distribution of talent among pilots and commanders? More broadly, how
many events treated statistically in combat/campaign simulation involve chaotic
and complex phenomena that make Monte Carlo processes and Markov assumptions inappropriate?
Warfare is renowned for extended periods of boredom followed by bursts of
intense activity during battle. The outcome of battles is determined by tens to
107 motivated agents performing individual functions that are more difficult to
represent than molecules in a liquid or gas. Agent-based models involve agents
executing rules based on the local information they have. These models are
known for demonstrating emergent behavior, such as the collapse of a line of
troops when adjacent soldiers retreat.128
Fundamental features of warfare suggest chaos and complexity sciences
may be more fruitful for understanding underlying phenomena than current
models.129
History, Cognitive and Social Sciences, and Artificial Intelligence. The cycle of
research for war gaming and combat/campaign simulation also extends to studying history and developments in social science, including experimental gaming
on human behavior (such as in behavioral economics) and cognitive science
studying developments in understanding the brain, etc., to explore human reasoning and dynamics.
AI has had recent success in defeating human champions in games such as
chess and Go, and increasingly is embedded in computers and weapons. Having
people who understand AI on a team conducting analysis campaigns will add
considerable value to the effort.
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Reviewing Previous Results. A final area of emphasis in a cycle of research is
reviewing previous results.
Clearly war gaming and campaign simulations are a blend of an objective, scientific
approach and the artistry of human designers and participants. What can be done to
evaluate how well individual studies, or a series of mutually reinforcing games, simulations, results, and conclusions have aided decision makers? One thing that is rarely
done is to review “old” studies and evaluate their strengths and weaknesses after the
projected future scenario year has passed. It is too much to ask, perhaps, for an evaluation of the study results and conclusion and it is exceedingly difficult to evaluate any
study’s impact on decisions it was to have enlightened.130

An objective examination of the scenario, the Red and Blue forces available,
and the Red and Blue force combat capabilities after the fact can consider how
well the study anticipated reality.131 Independent review of key features of the
analysis will contribute to objectivity and rigor and help to identify analytical
techniques appropriate to the subject matter.
The extent to which pseudoexperiments, whether war games or combat/
campaign simulations, are scientific depends wholly on the character of their
execution. “Electronic computers, game-theoretic models, and statistical formulas are but instruments after all; it is not they that produce scientific results
but the investigator who uses them.”132 Neither type of simulation is inherently
more scientific than the other. The principal difference is that combat/campaign
simulation is analytical—reducing the problem to constituent pieces—while war
gaming emphasizes synthesis—ensuring all relevant factors are considered, including how they work together.
War gaming and large-scale computer-based combat/campaign simulation
differ little in their inability to predict quantitative outcomes. The scientific value
of the pseudoexperiment lies in the objectivity, rigor, and usefulness of the theory
the pseudoexperiment represents. This includes the motivations, tastes and beliefs, and expertise of all the participants, including the client.
War gaming has a record of anticipating factors that largely govern outcomes,
thus preventing surprise. Because DoD has used combat/campaign simulation
for quantitative prediction, its performance at comparing quantitative results of
combat models with actual combat has been less accurate and less reliable than
that of war gaming that explored the processes and nonquantitative features that
would affect a campaign most. Whereas those commanding and conducting operations rarely have the motivation and skills to become deeply involved in combat/campaign modeling, they can make the time and do have the skills to participate in war gaming. Repeated war gaming can provide firsthand experiences
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to limit surprise and facilitate recognitive decision making that allows rapid
adaptation to emerging situations.
Using governing factors uncovered through war gaming, detailed computer
models, campaign analyses, or other techniques to create simple models of the
phenomena requires much more analytical skill than adding detailed models
of additional processes to existing computer models. Simpler models provide
greater understanding with appropriate precision than complicated computer
models with large numbers of variables that give an appearance of precision but
whose range of uncertainty is difficult to estimate and grows with the uncertainty
of each parameter added and the square root of the number of variables.
Returning to the roots of operations research—observing, modeling operations, and collecting data in the field—is an essential aspect of a cycle of research.
Work in the field yields data and knowledge that increase understanding of which
concepts actually work and which do not, and provides essential data for use in
computer and war-gaming simulation.
Although the discussion of questions and possibilities raised by developments
in complexity sciences is incomplete, it suggests a need to reexamine combat
models and to extend analytical techniques to add the rigor of appropriate techniques to combat simulation.
The Pentagon needs to overhaul its analysis paradigm if it is to meet growing
security challenges with limited budgets. Overhauling the Pentagon’s analysis
paradigm again will require interdisciplinary teams of scientists—from both hard
and social sciences, and with an appreciation for the humanities—interacting in
analysis campaigns and cycles of research. Client and contractor use and abuse
of need-to-know security barriers and proprietary restrictions on studies present
formidable obstacles to implementing scientific standards in DoD studies.
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